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ntil recently labo; diiputes were localized and highly 
Usite-specific in their regulation. Even if the employer 
was a multinational enterprise, a workplace controversy 
would almost invariably involve a particular union or group 
of employees in a given geographical location. At most, the 
conflict might atfect the company's plants in a whole country. 
But still the dispute would generally be subject to a single 
body of familiar laws and customs. The term "international 
labor dispute" was simply unknown to most practitioners and 
scholars in the labor field. 
All that is now changing. Professor Hepple, in his usual 
comprehensive and trenchant style, has already mapped out 
the emerging domain of internationalized labor disputes. 
Before proceeding to my own topic, the potential role of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), I should merely like to 
demonstrate with a few examples that the message about this 
worldwide phenomenon has even reached the parochial 
precincts of the United States. In April 2002 the Wall Street 
journdl described how several American universities were 
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same time, going beyond the labor field, President William K. 
Slate I1 of the American Arbitration Association announced 
the opening of the AAA's second International Center for 
Dispute Resolution, and its first in Europe, in Dublin. The 
AAA was already handling over 500 international mediation 
and arbitration cases annually in the commercial arca, 
involving nationals from 70 different countries. 
Dispute resolution on an international level presents some 
unique problems. Commercial litigators, for example, have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the operation of CIETAC - 
the China International Econonlic andTi-ade Arbitration 
Commission. They reportedly question the impartiality, 
independence, and professionalism of the arbitral panels. A 
majority of the arbitrators deciding cases involving foreign 
countries are Chinese, and CIETAC does not yet appear to 
have acquired a truly transnational character. Its caseload has 
declined steadily, from 829 in 1994 to 543 in 2000. If that is 
the experience in the commercial field, where business 
people presumably share many values in common, one can 
see where the pitfalls multiply in an area like labor and 
emploplent ,  with all its potential for class as well as 
economic conflict. 
My task is to  assess the ways in which alternative dispute 
resolution procedures may be adapted to deal with 
international labor disputes. ADR refers to various methods 
by which neutral third parties assist persons engaged in a 
conflict to  settle their differences \vithout involang the 
decision-making power of the state or other sanction- 
imposing body. Both mediation and arbitration are included. 
In mediation the neutral seeks to get the parties to agree on a 
mutually acceptable solution. In arbitration the neutral 
imposes a solution after presentations by the contellding 
parties. A third term, conciliation, is sometimes used and 
generally connotes a milder form of intervention than 
mediation. A conciliator may simply get the parties talking 
and do little to  direct the course of their exchanges. A 
mediator usually aims at a more structured dialogue. In each 
instance, the ADR procedure is a substitute for a more formal 
adversarial action before a court or administrative agency. At 
their best, mediation and arbitration have the advantages of 
speed, cost savings, and informality over court or 
administrative proceedings. 
Any effort to  use ADR procedures to settle labor disputes 
in an international setting must take into account that the 
parties may come from very different legal systems and 
widely varying cultural backgrounds. Even in the so-called 
Western World, the diversity of civil law and common law 
approaches to  arbitration has created problems that require 
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harmonization. Examples include distinctions between the 
<'. mquisitorial" and "adversarial" processes; the limited 01- 
extensive cross-examination of witnesses; elaborate or 
conclusory written pleadings; neutral or partisan expert 
\vitnesses; proof of foreign law as a matter of "law" or of 
"fact"; and the allocation of costs (an issue on which the 
common law systems of the United Kingdoin and the United 
States differ). 
Legal differences, being primarily intellectual constructs, 
may be the easier divide to bridge. Cultural differences, going 
to the essence of \who we are, could be the subtler but more 
stubborn obstacle. They have been said to be a major barrier 
to the effective use of mediation in resolving disputes under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Yet the 
"extraordinary diversity" of the \vorkforce at the United 
Nations has not been found an impediment to the successful 
operation of that organization's quasi-legal Joint Appeals 
Board for handling internal grievances. 
Are there practical ways to  minimize the adverse 
effects of cultural factors on the implementation of mediation 
and arbitration?The starting point has to be a recognition that 
cultural differences and a diversity in the ethnic background 
of the parties will play a part in any proceedings. It was only 
in the last couple of decades that neutrals in my country fully 
faced up to this as a fact of life in the American workplace. A 
healthy reaction was a deliberate effort to increase the 
number of minorities and females in the ranks of arbitrators 
and mediators. In mediation, especially, there is a need for 
creating trust of the neutral on the part of the disputants. 
Engaging persons for the neutral role whose backgrounds are 
similar to the contending parties is invaluable. There must be 
careful attention to the nuances of language use and 
communication styles. Some ethnic groups are accustomed to 
more formal, rational exchanges and others to  more relaxed, 
emotive ones. When agreement is reached, its immediate 
memorialization in writing may be advisable in Anglo- 
American cultures. In certain Asian and Hispanic cultures, 
insistence on speedy documentation might betoken distrust, 
and caution should be exercised. 
Good arbitrators do not necessarily make good mediators, 
and vjce rrez.sa. The ideal n~ediator will be a person of infinite 
patience, empathy, and flexibility. A topnotch arbitrator in 
handling a case will tend to be more impersonal and dccision- 
oriented. Probably the more important practical question is 
when, if at all, a person should try to perform as both 
mediator and arbitrator in the same proceedings. I am 
satisfied the answers will vary considerably depending on the 
te~nperament of the arbitrator, the chemistry existing 
between a given arbitrator and the disputants, and a subtle 
intuition of what particular circumstances permit or ordain. 
Evei-yone recognizes there is one substantial risk. If mediation 
is attempted and fails, the would-be arbitrator may by then be 
pi-ivy to confidential disclosures from one or both sides - 
the parties' "bottom line" for settlement, for example - that 
could be highly prejudicial when the arbitrator moves into a 
decision-making mode. Once one has been told about 
elephants, it is hard to put them out of mind.Yet the 
pragmatic response is that mediation bcfore arbitration often 
works, and when it does, it saves all concerned much time, 
money, and psychic wear-and-tear. That has led to the process 
known as "med-arb." 
Various classifications have been devised for analyzing 
different approaches to mediation. These are not watertight 
categories and the same mediator may shift from one type to 
another, even in the same proceedings. But one classification 
scheme I have found helpful is the follovving, listed in 
ascending order of intervention by the neutral: 
Transformative or collaborative mediation. The 
focus is on the state of the parties' relationship and its 
long-term development. The mediator does not try to lead 
so much as to get the parties to discover their o\vn 
separate and mutual resources and to understand the other 
person's point of viear. This is a good starting point from 
which to move on, if necessary, to other forms of 
mediation. It is not easy, ho~vever, to shift back to 
transformative mediation from a more active type. 
Evaluative mediation. The mediator does not attempt 
to come up with a specific solution but concentrates on 
showing the respective strengths and weaknesses of each 
party's position. Mediators using this technique may begin 
by holding separate meetings with the parties in an effort 
to fully understand their perspectives. Thereafter, 
especially if the parties have had a longstanding 
relationship, the effort will generally be to keep them 
together as much as possible, talking and listening to the 
mediator and each other. 
Directive or result-oriented mediation. Here, quite 
deliberately, the aim is to bring the parties to a certain 
goal that the mediator, at some point in the process, has 
concluded is appropriate and achievable. Some mediators 
employing this approach \\rill sit down with both parties 
and let them talk to the mediator, not each other, with the 
more agitated going first.Yet each party hears the otl~er's 
story with the rervor behind it. The ground rules \?rill 
forbid personal attacks by the speaker or interruptions by 
the listener. Even so, caucuses may be required fi-om time 
to time to cool tcmpers, to permit confidential 
cominunications to the mediator, and to move the 
negotiations along to~r~ard closure. Other mediators \\rill 
spend the bulk of their time meeting separately with the 
opposing parties. 
Transcending all these questions of technique is a very 
simple human [actor that constitutes a key ingredient of 
success in mediation: the trust and confidence the parties 
come to repose in the neutral third pal-ty. And for me that 
reflects the Pi-incipal glory of the mediation process. Other 
aspects of dispute resolution, both traditional and alternative, 
may be more intellectually challenging and philosophically 
oriented. But in mediation the emphasis is on the total input 
of all three participants - the claimant, the respondent, and 
the neutral - in working together to reach a solution that is 
mutually acceptable to the contending parties. The result may 
lack the coherence and elegance of a finely reasoned judicial 
o r  arbitral opinion.Yet the mediation product is a joint, 
voluntary creation, and its frequent rough edges bear 
testimony to its source in n~ultiple human hands. Even as 
mediators may wince at the imperfections of the final 
settlement, they can take pride in the knowledge that the 
trust and confidence they generated led two opposing camps 
to find their own common ground, without the fiat of some 
external force. 
The graduated steps of neutral in\-olvement that 
characterize the various forms of mediation just described have 
obvious attractions in the international labor field. Parties that 
may initially be suspicious of or even hostile to any sort of 
outsider intervention can be introduced to the process through 
the least intrusive type, transformative or collaborative 
mediation. Then, once trust and confidence in the mediator 
haw been established, the parties can be led gradually, if that is 
necessary, into the stages or kinds of mediation where the 
neutral plays a more active and directive role. 
In arbitration the neutral is no longer an intermediary or  
"matchmaker" betlveen the disputants but a decision maker. 
The process is still generally voluntary in that the parties have 
agreed to enter into it and have agreed on the arbitrator or 
on the manner of selecting that person.Yet once the 
proceedings are under way, the arbitrator is largely in charge. 
Lacking are much of tile informality and nearly all the sense 
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of a voice in the outcoine that are found in mediation. That 
nlakes it especiall!. important, \vhen dealing \vith parties 
from \\.idely varying cultural and socioecononiic 
backgrounds, as often occurs in international arbitration, to 
ensure fairness and the perception of fairness to  all 
concerned. Nonetheless, arbitration still shnes in letting 
determined conlbatants meet in an arena that is less 
intimidating, less rule-driven, and less likely to disrupt 
ongoing relationships than a courtroom or an administrative 
agent),. And if administered intelligentl~~, arbitration can also 
be gentler on the parties' pocketbooks, their tin~esheets, and 
their psyches. 
Other participants in this seniular \\;ill address the need to 
formulate \vorkers' rights in ~vhat  could other\vise become an 
oppi-essil-e global econom),. Arbitrators can play only a limited 
role in this process. The most common form of arbitration is 
so-called gr ie~ance or "rights" arbitration, dealing with claims 
arising under existing contracts, statutes, or other 
regulations. Here the standards or criteria to be applied are 
external to the arbitrator, typically supplied either by a prior 
agreement of the disputing parties or by legislative or 
administrati1.e action. Even in the rarer type of "interests" or 
ne\\r-contract arbitration, the arbitrator \\.ill generally be 
directed to  dra\v upon the models established in the esisting 
contracts of coinparable parties. Thus, arbitrators may ha1.e a 
significant hand in the enforcement or even the extension of 
\\.orkers1 rights but seldom if el-er in their original creation. 
The latter \\-ill largely be the responsibility of ot l~er  bodies. 
In the United States, the single arbitrator has become the 
norm in labor disputes. Arbitrators may be fulltime 
professionals or part-timers dra~vn from uni~rersity faculties 
of la\\., economics, or industrial relations. The indi~.idual may 
be selected b>- the parties ad hoc, either by mutual agreement 
or by selection from a list Furnished by a public or pri\.ate 
"designating agency." Or the arbitrator may bc a "permanent 
umpire" or a nlelnber of a rotating panel maintnined by a 
particular company and a particular union. 
For most parties, the choice of the arbitrator is a critical 
matter. There is evidence that this may bc less important than 
it seems, that there is a remarkable similarity in the 
conclusions reached b>, different arbitrators, even those \\rith 
relatively little experience. Nonetheless, it \r,ould be hard LO 
convince most parties, especially those coming from the far 
corners of the earth, that ~t doesn't make much difference 
\\rho the arbitrator is. Indeed, in international disputcs it ma;, 
make inore difference than it does \\,hen both parties are 
located in the sanie city or countr),. In any e\.ent, parties 
e\w-).\~liere t!rpically \!,ant decision makers who "include 
people n-110 look and think like theill." 
The solution, at least in the early years of international 
arbitrations, may be a tripartite panel. This \\.as once fairly 
common in the United States, and it is still used in some very 
important or complicated cases, particularly those that 
require setting the terms of a nen. contract as distinguished 
from resolying a grievance under an esisting agreement. The 
usual procedure is for each party to select its own "delegate" 
or panel member, and then for those t ~ v o  to choose a third, 
impartial person to act as chair and cast the deciding \.ate. 
The great advantage is that no\\. each side lino~vs there is 
someone \vho \!.ill be able to speak quietly with the arbitrator 
in executi-\.e session, and who cat1 niake sure that the 
arbitrator has not misunderstood some point or discounted 
the importance of a given position. When parties speak 
different languages, have different ethnic, socioeconomic, and 
religious backgrounds, and may be quite unequal in 
bargaining strength, it could be all the more 1-eassuring to 
have a voice on the inside. 
This also underlines the urgent need to develop a cadre of 
international labor arbitrators fluent in \a-ious languages and 
- - 
con~fortable in multicultural settings, \\.ho call ser\,e either as 
chairs of tripartite panels or be the sole decision makers if 
and ~ v h e n  that becomes generally acceptable. 1 have handled 
arbitrations ~v i th  French, Russian, and Spanish translators, 
and it worked reasonably \\.ell. But those cases in~olved a 
single system of lalv and elnployment practice. We move to 
another level of cor~lplexity and potential mistrust in an 
international labor dispute. 
The biblical King Solornon is oftell cited as the first 
arbitrator. In deciding bet\~,een the t\vo \\,omen clainiing the 
one surviving infant, Solomon rclied much inlore on his 
assessmcnt of maternal instincts than on tcclu~ical niceties 
like rules of evidence, burtleil or prool, and established 
precedent. It almost seems as if arguments ha1.e raged evcr 
since about n-hether creeping legalism \vould be the ruination 
of arbitration. I11 the labor field in the United States, 
employers, unions, and their repres~ntati\~es ha\~e tended over 
time to hvor increasing formality in the proceedings and a 
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rcliancc on prior rulings in thc dccisionc. That crrucrurea 
approach promotes prctlictahility antl tlic autonomy of thc 
parties, since it limits thc tliscrction of the arbitrators. 
The An_~lo-American common la\\. has rlc~~isccl an clabord~u 
l3odv of cvidcntiar~ rules to determine \\.hat kinds of testimony 
and cxhihits arc. atlmissihlc in court proceedings. The aim is to 
acccpt only what is competcnt, tliat is, of a cre(lible nature, and 
rclc~.ant, that is, hearing a logical relationship to the issucs in a 
CASC. A major function of thcsc rules is to protect juries from 
niislcarling antl cxtrancous c~idcnce. Most arhitrators \{ill 
point out they are not jurors in a civil trial and thus they do 
not fccl bound b!. the tcchnical rules of eviclcnce. 
Nevertheless, there is a ~vcalth of common sense in the 
or rationales untierl\.ing most evidentiary rules, and 
arhitrators \ \ i l l  gencrall~. pa!, hccd to these. 
An csamplc is the treatment of hearsay. Hearsay is the 
testimony of a lvitncss about \\,hat someone else said, \vhen 
offercd to pro\.e the truth of that other person's statement. It 
is objcctionahlc hecause it is not subject to cross-examination 
and is thercforc less credible. Hearsay also includes 
documents like affidavits, reports, etc. Courts exclude 
heai-say, subject to a number of exceptions such as records 
prepared in the normal course of business. Much hearsay is 
admitted in arbitrations but it ic given less \\-eight than direct 
e~~idence.  Doctors' certifications that an employee \vas absent 
from work hecause of illncss are usually accepted, although 
the!. are not nccessarily conclusive. On the other hand, an 
emplovee's discharge \vould rarcly if ever be upheld on the 
basis of liearsav alone. 
The burden and the standard of proof are other areas 
\vhcrc arbitration draws on legal concepts hut introduces its 
o\vn variations. '4s in a court, the mo~.ing partv, \\-hether 
union, eniplovce, or emplovcr, ordinarily has tlie hurden of 
proof, i.e., thc 1-equircment of satisfying the arbitrator tliat its 
position should be uphcld. That is certainly accepted in claims 
of a contract 1,iolation. Rut in ctnplo\.ee disciplinarv cases, the 
long-cstablislicd practice in 1alx-n- arbitrations in the United 
States has hccn tliat the eniplo\w- hcars the burden of proof. 
No\$., as a practical niattcr it makes sense tliat the emplover, 
\vliich best kno1j.s \\ liy it decided to discipline or discharge 
the n.orkcr, should go first in prcsctiting its e\.idence. That 
alone, ho\\rc\.cr, does not justify placing the ultimate burden 
of proof or persuasion on thc cmplovcr. Perhaps tlie loss of a 
jo1) (01- other serious discipline) is such a major hlo\\; 
ccononiicall\ and othcr~vise, to an emplovcc tliat it is thought 
fair and rcasonal3lc for the emplover to have to dcmotistt-ate 
the appl-opriatcncss of its action. 
In civil actions at common la\\; the standard of proof, o r  
rcquit-cd qlrunrum, is a siniplc prc.ponc1erancc of the cvidcncc, 
that is, tlic factual position of tlie party n-it11 the l~urden of 
proof must he more likcly true than not ( 5  1-49) for that 
partv to prc\.ail. Most arbitrators n-ill apply that standard in 
contract interpretation cases. It gets niorc complicater1 in 
ciiiplovce disciplinary cases. A fe\v arhitrators \\-ill acccpt the 
arLpment that a termination amounts to "economic capital 
~unishment" and that the criminal law standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt ought to apply. Other arbitrators 
emphasize that a discipline case, even one involving a 
discharge, is still a ci\*il proceeding, and the standard of proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence should suffice. Because of 
the impact on the employee, a substantial number of 
arbitrators, perhaps a majority, demand "clear and convincing 
proof" in a discharge case, at least when the alleged 
misconduct in\-ol\.es acts of moral turpitude which could 
adversel!. affect the \I-orker's future job prospects and 
reputation in the community. 
There are respected '4merican arbitrators who insist that 
concepts like the burden or standard of proof are of no 
practical ~i~gnificance. The! feel the!. must aln-avs decide 
which partv is more convincing. But once in a great ~vhile I
find I cannot make an!- such determination; the evidence is in 
equilibrium. It is then that burden of proof comes into pla\; 
and the partv bearing it loses. Similar variations exist in 
arbitrators' attitudes about the standard of proof, especially in 
discharge cases. Regardless of ho\v one answers these 
questions, ho\ve\.er, I belicve they \vill occasion all^ ha\-e to  he 
confronted and resol\.ed. 
One preliminary step that is generally unnecescarv in 
union-management arbitrations mav frequentlv be required in 
arbitrations involving individual employees and their 
emplovers. That is discoverv, the process hv \I-hich 
interrogatories (a set of written questions) or depositions 
(s\vorn prc-hearing testimony) are used to obtain disclosure 
of  pertincnt hackground information. In tlie collective 
bargaining contest, such matcrial is custoniarilv sccurcd in 
the contractually pro\.ided g r i e ~ m c e  procedure preceding the 
hearing or e\.en preceding the decision to arbitrate. But the 
indi~idual emplo~*ee does not normall\- have access to  this 
relatively informal niethod of getting the facts necded to 
prepare for and conduct thc arbitration. 
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Discovery calls for a dificult balancing act by the 
arbitrator. Enough discovery must be granted to apprise both 
parties of the critical facts of the case. But discovery must not 
be permitted to be carried to such lengths that it becomes a 
tactic for stall-and-delay, draining the resources of the weaker 
party, as often happens in court litigation. Somewhat 
arbitrary quantitative limits may have to be placed on the 
questions asked, depositions taken, and time allowed. Perfect 
justice is not a feasible goal for arbitration; the price is simply 
too great. A reasonably fair result, without an excessive 
expenditure of time and money, is the realistic objective. 
American courts enforce both agreements to arbitrate and 
awards issued by arbitrators. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that a dispute is subject to arbitration if the claim "on its 
face is governed by the contract," adding: "Doubts should be 
resolved in favor of coverage." In enforcing an arbitral award, 
courts should not attempt to "review the merits" and correct 
mistaken findings of fact or misinterpretations of the 
contract. A court may set aside an award only on such 
erounds as fraud or corruption, the arbitrator's exceeding of 
the authority granted by the parties' submission, or a 
violation of positive law or"  'some explicit public policy' that 
is 'well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by 
reference to laws and legal precedents and not from general 
considerations of supposed public interests."'The net effect is 
a high degree of judicial deference to the arbitration process. 
The arbitrator's judLgment is what the parties bargained for 
and their commitment should be honored. 
American courts have been similarly expansive in 
enforcing international arbitration agreements, applying both 
the United Nations [NewYork] Convention on the 
RecoLpition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and 
the United States Arbitration Act. The Convention provides 
that a state may declare it is applicable only to "relationships, 
whether contractual or not, which are considered as 
commercial. . . ."A "commercial" relationship in this context 
has been held to include employment. The New York 
Convention, to which some 125 countries are now parties, 
limits the grounds for not enforcing a foreign arbitral award. 
They include the invalidity of the arbitration agreement 
under whatever law is applicable, a denial of due process to a 
party, an award in excess of the scope of the submission, an 
unauthorized arbitral tribunal or procedure, or a violation of 
the public policy of the country where enforcement is 
sought. In light of the worldwide acceptance of the NewYork 
Convention, it appears that judicial enforcement will be the 
least of the problems in making ADR an effective device for 
handling international labor disputes. 
ADR procedures exhibit some very special attractions in 
the international arena, and perhaps especially for less 
affluent disputants from developing nations. Properly 
administered, ADR does not entail the cost or timc or trauma 
of a court suit. Bevond that, it possesses one supreme 
attribute: it maximizes the in\,olven~ent of thc opposing 
parties. This is preeminently true of mediation, of course, 
where nothing is final until the parties themsel\les say so.Yet 
even in arbitration they have a major voice. Subject to lcgal 
restrictions, they can select the arbitrator, frame the issue, 
define the remedies, and even spcll out procedural details. 
Participation and empowrerment are central to ADR. And the 
resolution of any dispute is most likely to be accepted and 
lasting when the contending parties have had a hand in its 
fashioning. 
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